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Introduction
Capital Punishment is one issue that Americans fmnly agree on. According
to a 1995 Gallup Poll, 77% ofAmericans are in favor ofcapital punishment for
a person convicted of murder (Moore 23). This enormous level of support is
amazing when one considers that the United States is the only Western
industrialized nation that still continues to use capital punishment (Smith and
Wright 122).
An endless number ofresearchers have analyzed the many different aspects
of the use ofcapital punishment in the United States. Most of this research has
focused on the effects ofcapital punishment. Specifically, much ofthe existing
literature seeks to determine whether it acts as a deterrent to potential murderers
and whether it is racially biased in its implementation. While these are necessary
questions to examine, one crucial aspect has been neglected. Very few studies
have sought to explore the causes of state variation in capital punishment
policy.
This research uses logistic regression analysis to determine how certain
variables impact state capital punishment policy. The analysis will specifically
focus on the determinants of whether or not a state uses capital punishment.
The results should prove to be practically useful to those that support and
oppose the use of capital punishment because it can help activists determine
where they should focus their efforts and resources to influence capital
punishment policy.
A BriefHistory
Any examination of the modem use of capital punishment must begin in
1972. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court made a monumental ruling in
Furman v. Georgia. The Court held that every death-sentencing statute then
in place was arbitrary and potentially discriminatory. Thus, the statutes violated
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment (Baldus,
Woodworth, and Pulaski, Jr. 1). However, this ruling also spelled out how a
state's statute might be deemed constitutional. Essentially, a state must be able
to prove that its use of capital punishment is systematic and does not
discriminate against certain races. Many states passed new statutes that they
felt would prove to be constitutional. In 1976, the Court cleared the way for
executions to begin anew. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld Georgia's
newly passed statute and thus set the precedent that the use of capital
punishment can be constitutional (Russell 20). Public opinion on capital
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punishment has shifted drastically since the early 1970s. In 1971, only 49% of
the public supported the use ofcapital punishment. This figure jumped to 65%
by 1976. As already mentioned, a 1995 Gallup poll reveals that this percentage
has climbed to 77% (Moore 25). Currently, 38 of the 50 states use capital
punishment.
Literature Review
As mentioned earlier, there is very little research that directly examines the
determinants ofstate variation in capital punishment policy. However, there is
a lot ofresearch on otller aspects ofcapital punishment that has influenced the
design and goals of this research. The connection between the literature and
this research should begin to reveal itself in this section. The literature that
specifically pertains to the development ofthe hypotheses will be discussed in
a later section.
Much of the recent literature on capital punishment has explored whether
or not it is racially biased. Despite the incredible amount of research on this
issue, the academic world has still yet to reach a consensus. A lot ofthis is due
to differing perceptions that shape how one views the world. Gregory D.
Russell's research directly challenges the rationale the Supreme Court uses to
determine the existence of racial bias. He reminds readers that the Court has
required defendants to present overt~d direct evidence ofracial bias. Russell
stresses that much oftoday's racism is less direct and more institutionalized
(127). One specific example he gives is that Caucasian support of capital
punishment is far greater than that of African Americans. When courts are
placing people onjuries, they usually dismiss those that admit to being unable
to sentence someone to death in all circumstances. Russell's study shows a
clear relationship between racial bias and support for capital punishment. Russell
maintains that this system inherently leads to proportionally having more racists
on juries than exist in the overall population (128).
Those that claim capital punishment is not racist have empirical proof to
support their claims. Between 1976 and 1985,47 people were executed. Twenty-
eight were Caucasian, 17 were African American, and 2 were Hispanic. Some
claim that these figures show that capital punishment is actually biased against
Caucasians. This is because in this same time frame only 35% ofthose arrested
for murder and non-negligent homicide were Caucasian (Johnson 44). Once
again, it is clear that one's interpretation of this data is conditioned by how
much one attributes an individual's behavior to circumstances that he or she
can directly control. Some argue that the fact that African Americans make up
only 12% of the population but 50% of the murderers shows that inequality
and racism persist in American society. One could argue that in an equal society
these two percentages would be equal and the fact that they are not is caused
by the poverty, oppression, and despair that results from current prejudices
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and the lingering effects ofAmerica's racist past. One ofthe preeminent scholars
on urban poverty, William Julius Wilson, discusses the violence caused by the
cycle ofunfortunate circumstances and inequality. He states, "Neighborhoods
plagued by high levels ofjoblessness are more likely to experience low levels
of social organization: the two go hand in hand. High rates of joblessness
trigger otherneighborhood problems that undermine social organization, ranging
from crime, gang violence, and drug trafficking to family breakups and problems
in the organization of family life" (21). While this research deals with state
policy making and not public opinion, it will become clear in the explanation of
the hypotheses that these varying perspectives about racial bias have had a
fundamental impact on this research.
The other aspect of capital punishment that has gotten a lot of attention
from researchers has been whether or not it deters potential criminals. As M.
Watt Espy, Jf. points out, proponents of capital punishment repeatedly fall
back on its supposed deterrence effect as a primary reason why it should
continue to be used as a form of punishment. He also says that logically this
means that executions should be most effective in deterring potential violent
criminals when they are as public as possible (537). Studies on the effectiveness
of public executions have resulted in mixed conclusions. Steve Stack used a
multivariate time-series model to study the effects ofpublicized executions in
Georgia between 1950 and 1965. He found that in this time period a publicized
execution was associated with a 6.8% increase in homicides in the month
following the execution ("Execution..." 25). However, a later study done by
Stack revealed different results. Using data from 1977-1984, he performed a
variety of regression analyses to examine the differing effects of publicized
executions on Caucasians and African Americans over varying time spans
("The Impact. .." 178). He found that publicized executions had no effect on the
homicide rates for African Americans, but did result in a significant decrease in
the homicide rate for Caucasians (172).
Overall, nearly all studies have found no empirical causal connection
between the use of capital punishment and actual deterrence effects on
homicides. William J. Bowers and Glenn Pierce studied data from the state of
New York between 1907-1963. They found that, on average, there were two
additional homicides in the month after an execution (453). William C. Bailey
used time-series regression analysis to examine the deterrent effect. He found
that sociodemographic factors, such as income, education, race, unemployment,
and urban population, are better predictors ofa state's homicide rate than use
ofcapital punishment (235).
The final piece ofliterature that needs to be mentioned at this point is the
one that most closely relates to this research. It is the only study that directly
aims to analyze state variation in capital punishment policy. Bijou Yang's and
David Lester's study titled "Which States have the Death Penalty: Data from
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1980" appeared in Psychological Reports in 1989. Yang and Lester used data
on 37 social characteristics to analyze the social correlates of the presence of
capital punishment in the states by using factor analysis. They found that
"states with greater social instability (divorce, interstate migration, and low
church attendance) and in the south were more likely to have a death penalty"
(185). The research to be presented here is not as concerned with the
psychological and sociological sources of state policy variation. Yang and
Lester left some key variables unexplored. If one seeks to understand the
factors that influence a state's capital punishment policy, one cannot ignore
the political variables that almost assuredly impact any type ofpolicy formation.
Research Design
This research specifically seeks to examine the factors that influence state
variation in capital punishment policy. Only factors that might affect the
legislators that make such policy and the output produced by these elected
officials will be examined. The specific aspect ofcapital punishment policy that
this research explores is the determinants ofwhether or not a state uses capital
punishment. Those that do not use capital punishment were coded as a "0" in
the data file while those that do currently use it were coded as a "1." Nebraska
is not included in this research because it has non-partisan state congressional
elections.
There are eleven separate independent variables that are initially included
in the regression model. These variables include a mixture ofsociodemographic
variables, political variables, and criminal justice variables. A variety of
sociodemographic variables are necessary to include because in theory a
government's policy outputs should be in part dictated by the opinions and
traits of its constituency. It is reasonable to assume that different groups of
people will have different policy preferences and will display varying degrees
ofpolitical involvement. It is clear that it is vital to include the political variables
that Yang and Lester left out of their research because policy making in the
state legislatures will inevitably be influenced by political ideologies and
partisanship within the government and the population. Criminal Justice
variables are included because the actual amount of crime in a state might
cause a reaction that directly influences the development ofcapital punishment
policy.
Independent Variables
1. % Non-White
-The percent of Caucasians in each state was subtracted from 100%.
-The World Almanac and Book ofFacts: 1998
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2. Murder Rate
-1994 murder rate per 100,000
-Hovey and Hovey, CQ's State Fact Finder
3. Crime Rate
-1994 crime rate per 100,000
-Hovey and Hovey, CQ's State Fact Finder
4. % Urban
-1990 Census of the Population
-Duncan and Lawrence, Congressional Quarterly's Politics in
America 1998
5. Average Income
-The 1995 per capita personal income figures were adjusted for each state's
cost of living by dividing the per capita personal income figure by the cost of
living index number for each state. This was done to ensure that the fluctuations
in average income were not a product of the differences in cost of living.
-Hovey and Hovey, CQ's State Fact Finder
6. Educational Attainment
-% of the population with college degrees
-Hovey and Hovey, CQ's State Fact Finder
7. Fundamentalist Protestants
-1974 data indicating the percent of Fundamentalist Protestants in each state.
-Erickson, Wright, and McIver, Statehouse Democracy
8. 1996 Presidential Vote
-percent of the two-party vote for Bob Dole
-Gerald Pomper, The Election of1996
9. State Legislative Partisan Split
-The first step was to find the lower House partisan splits between the
Republicans and the Democrats for each even numbered year between 1976
and 1998. Then, the percentage ofRepublicans in office for each state during
this time frame was determined. These percentages were then averaged. Next,
the distance was measured from 50% so that the data would not be affected by
whether the splits favored the Democrats or Republicans. This was done so
that only the impact ofcompetition and not partisanship would be evaluated in
the regression model.
-The Book ofthe States
10. Voter Party Identification
-This variable is taken from 1996 exit polls. It is the percent ofDemocrats minus
the percent of Republicans. This subtraction method was used to weed out
some of the effects of varying levels of independent voters.
-The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
11. Voter Ideology
-percent conservative minus percent liberal
-The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research
16 Cody Smith
The analysis will also try to control for the effects ofa state's region. It is
quite possible that a state's regional "personality" will lead to certain
independent variables having different effects on the dependent variable. It is
necessary to explore such possibilities because it enables one to get a clearer
understanding of the relationships between the independent variables and the
dependent variable. This is especially true when dealing with an issue such as
capital punishment thatis prone to being influenced by a state's overall political
culture
Hypotheses
1. As the percentage ofnon-white citizens in a state's population increases,
the likelihoodofastate having capital punishment increases.
Americans are divided on how blind justice truly is. A 1995 Gallup poll
revealed that 66% ofAfrican Americans believe that the American justice
system is biased against African Americans (Saad and McAneny 32). M.
Dwayne Smith andJames Wright show that this racial divide in public opinion
on issues pertaining to justice and the legal process holds for capital
punishment. In their 1992 study, they found that 75% of Caucasians support
the use ofcapital punishment while only 44% of African Americans do. This
indicates that there is a certain sentiment in the African American population
that direct racism contaminates the pursuit of justice in the American legal
process and/or that the legacies of historical racism have become
institutionalized and thus created a social structure that inherently
disadvantages the minority population.
It might seem logical to assume from this split in public opinion that states
with more minorities should be less likely to use capital punishment. A state
with a larger 111inoritypopulation would be comprised of more people that
oppose the use ofcapital punishment. Clearly, this goes against the hypothesis.
This is becausethe logical conclusion just presented assumes that Caucasian
voters' opinion on capital punishment is consistent regardless of the percentage
ofmillorities illthe population. In Southern Politics in State and Nation, V.O.
Key, Jr. claimsthatthepresence ofminorities affects the political thought and
behavior ofthe Caucasian citizens that live among them. He states, "Whatever
phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or
later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro" (5). Historically, the racial issues
has unified the South politically and given Caucasians of various political
persuasions a single issue to rally around. Key, Jr. thinks that it is this racism
and the fervent desire to keep the minority citizens of the South out of the
political process that have allowed the wealthy members of the southern elite
to have a monopoly on power. The poor in the South have been too afraid to
fonn a separate faction in the political structure because they feared that this
would increase the voice of the minority population. Key, Jr.'s theory clearly
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seems to indicate that some of the political behavior displayed by Caucasians
is influenced by their reactions to living among people ofdifferent races.
It is Key, Jr. 's theory that has led to the relationship predicted in the
hypothesis. Very few would argue that America has completely rid itselfofthe
racist element in its public or private sphere. The research by Smith and Wright
indicates that African Americans still feel an element of direct and
institutionalized racism pervades the application oftrue justice. Key, Jr. 's theory
ofthe presence ofracial minorities affecting the political outlooks ofCaucasian
citizens should hold for the issue ofcapital punishment. Those in states with a
higher percentage of minorities in the population will see more news stories
about minority citizens who have been charged with and convicted ofmurder.
America's lingering racism and the proportionally high frequency of African
American murderers will create a reactionary fear and thus an increasing desire
to have the most extreme form ofpunishment. However, one would expect that
the impact of the racial composition of the popul~tion will be different for
different regions with different political cultures. States such as Rhode Island
that come from a different region than a state like Mississippi would seem less
likely to be influenced by the presence of a minority population when
establishing capital punishment policy. It also is logical to conclude that
minorities from these more liberal states will have more access to the political
process and thus more influence in the policy making process.
2. As the percentage of Fundamentalist Protestant citizens in a state's
population increases, the likelihood of a state having capital punishment
increases.
In their article "Religion, Punitive Justice, and Support for the Death
Penalty," Harold Grasmick, John Cochran, Robert J. Bursik, Jr., and M'Lou
Kimpel show that Fundamentalist Protestants' views on human nature lead
them to have very unique views on criminal behavior. They hypothesize that
Fundamentali~tProtestants are more punitive in their criminal justice policy
preferences because they attribute criminal behavior to dispositional
characteristics, not situational factors (289). To test their hypothesis, they
conducted a simple random sample of395 adults in Oklahoma City (297). They
note that punitiveness is also highly correlated with political conservatism.
Therefore they included control variables, such as political party identification
to control for the possibility that the punitive views of Fundamentalist
Protestants are not merely the result of the political pmtisanship (300). They
ran logistic regressions ofpreferences for five different criminal justice policies.
They found that, after controlling for the effects of other variables, liberal/
moderate Protestants are significantly less punitive than Fundamentalist
Protestants on all of the criminal justice policy preference questions except for
the use of deadly force by the police. Two of the four variables in which a
significant relationship is shown included the death penalty.
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Their research clearly shows that Fundamentalist Protestants are more
likely to support the use of capital punishment. However, this does not
necessarily mean that it will hold true in this analysis. The researchjust discussed
analyzes only individuals' opinions. This research will explore the connection
between public opinion and policy outputs. It should also shed some light on
how much ofan influence Fundamentalist Protestants have in the policy making
process.
3. As the crime and murder rates in a state increase, the likelihood ofa state
having capital punishment increases.
If policy makers believe that capital punishment does in fact act as a
deterrent, then it would logically follow that states which have higher murder
rates and crime rates would have more incentive to implement it. A higher
murder and crime rate might also lead to a state's citizenry developing a punitive
attitude towards justice because they are more routinely the victims of such
crimes and more frequently hear about such terrible crimes that might warrant
the use of capital punishment.
The primary problem with this theory is a causal one. One could argue th.at
it is the state's policy on capital punishment that dictates the criminal behavior
of its citizenry. This should especially be taken into consideration due to the
fact that the murder and crime rates come from 1994 figures while the states'
capital punishment policies have been forming since 1976. While this issue of
causality definitely needs to be considered, it does not necessarily mean that
this relationship can only flow in one direction. Actions can lead to a
punishment, which can then cause certain reactions. Essentially, a cycle begins
and it becomes difficult to separate the causes and effects. The one thing that
supports the approach taken in this study is that repeated research has shown
that the use of capital punishment does not act as a deterrent. Therefore, what
becomes more important are the perceptions about its potential effectiveness.
In this situation of perceived over actual effects, it appears that high murder
and crime rates would encourage policy makers to act on its perceived belief in
the existence ofa deterrent effect.
4. As the partisan split in a state's lower house increases, the likelihood ofits
having capital punishment increases.
This hypothesis aims to explore the effects political competition in a state's
legislature has on policy making. The connection between competition, the
representativeness of government, and policy outputs has been an issue of
great debate between scholars.
V.O. Key, Jf. is one ofthe first to be mentioned in any discussion about the
effects of political competition on policy outputs. He claimed that the "have
nots" lose under representation characterized by non-competitive politics. His
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reasoning is that in such cases the dominant party faces no competition and
thus no real threat to their electability. Therefore, the dominant party does not
need to actively pursue the votes ofthe "have nots" because they are powerful
enough to win elections without their support and can continue to meet the
needs and preferences of the wealthy already in power. In areas with highly
competitive politics, every vote matters and thus politicians must make overtures
to the "have nots." Key, Jr. theorized that competitive politics and the related
focus on the "have nots" will result in more emphasis on social issues such as
welfare expenditures and regressive tax systems (307). It could be reasonably
argued that the death penalty is an issue that is of more importance to the
"have nots." This argument is especially convincing when one considers the
drastic split in public opinion over capital punishment between Caucasians
and African Americans. According to Key, Jr.'s theory, states with less
competition should be more likely to use capital punishment because opposition
to its usage comes more from the voices of the "have nots."
Many scholars have sought to test Key, Jr.'s theory on competition and
policy outputs. One leader in the field that has done so is Thomas R. Dye. In
his book Politics, Economics and the Public, he presents research that he
claims shows that competition and participation do not influence public policy
outputs once one controls for the effects of income, urban, and education
(293). He essentially claims that the image ofpartisan politics influencing the
direction ofpolicy outputs is all a mirage and that neither the parties' differing
political philosophies nor the voters' policy preferences affect the policy outputs
produced by elected officials.
One of the more recent researchers to empirically explore this divisive
issue is Harvey Tucker. Tucker presents his results in his article "Interparty
Competition in the American States" that appeared in American Politics
Quarterly. He determined that there is a clear connection between competition
and policy outputs. Specifically, he found that increased competition in the
lower house of a state's legislature leads to increased welfare expenditures
(109). This directly supports Key, Jr.'s contention about the need to please the
"have nots" in a competitive political system. However, Norman Luttberg
questions Tucker's methodological approach to the issue. He questions
Tucker's use ofwelfare expenditures as a dependent variable because he claims
that it is too dependent upon a state's wealth and therefore may be the true
driving force behind a state's welfare expenditures. He insists that a better
measure ofpolicy outputs that might favor the "have nots" is the regressiveness
of the tax system because it is not as influenced by a state's wealth. After
substituting the regressiveness of the tax system for welfare expenditures, he
shows that no relationship exists with the amount of political competition
within a state (178).
Clearly this is an issue that has yet to be answered. This research will add
to the existing literature on this issue. The use ofcapital punishment is a policy
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favored more by Caucasians and less by African Americans or the "have nots"
described by Key, Jr. Considering the racial division in public opinion, Key,
Jr. 's theory seems logical because it is less likely that the minority voice will be
heard in non-competitive politics.
5. As the percentage ofRepublican voters in a state increases, the likelihood
ofa state having capital punishment increases.
Party labels enable voters to categorize their choices and vote for the
candidates oftheir preferred party-the party which they perceive to be closest
to their interests (Bibby 12). A 1995 Gallup poll revealed that 89% of self-
identified Republicans support the use of capital punishment while only 67%
of those that identify themselves as Democrats do (Moore 25). The results
from the regression model should reveal what type ofinfluence public opinion
and specifically voter partisanship has on state capital punishment policy
making. If the results reveal that no relationship exists, then this might be a
sign that public opinion, as shown through partisan identification, does not
influence legislators when it comes to capital punishment policy. A non-
relationship could also simply be due to the fact that capital punishment policy
was established at a time when states' partisan makeup differed from today's
current splits. However, it also must be remembered that ifa relationship does
exist, it does not necessarily mean that the legislators are making their public
policy choices based on public opinion. It might be that a more Republican
voting base tends to elect more officials that happen to share similar stances
with them. In essence, an elected official's own opinions may be an intervening
variable between the voters' partisanship and capital punishment policy output.
Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
The data in Table I presents a preliminary comparison between those
states that do use capital punishment and those that do not. It provides an
efficient and effective way to initially consider what variables show a clear
variation between the two groups of states. One of the figures that stands out
is that minorities makeup 17.6% of the population in the states that do use
capital punishment while they are only 12.5% of the population in those that
do not. It is also interesting to note the almost non-existent difference in the
level ofcompetition in the state legislatures. Overall, these figures indicate that
states that use capital punishment have a larger minority population, higher
murder and crime rates, are more urban, have a higher per capita income level,
are less educated, have a lower percentage ofFundamentalist Protestants, and
have a more Republican and conservative population. While these figures
enable one to make a quick comparison between the states, they do not indicate
what the true relationships are between the various independent variables and
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the use ofcapital punishment because the data does not control for the effects
that the independent variables may be having on each other. It is for this
reason that it is necessary to tum to a more complex method of empirical
analysis. Logistic regression analysis allows one to control for the effects of
the other independent variables and also lets one determine the explanatory
power of the independent variables taken as a whole.
Tablel
Descriptive Statistics
Use Do Not Use
Capital Punishment Capital Punishment
N=37 N=12
Std. Std.
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Minority 17.59 9.07 12.52 17.91
Murder 8.14 4.06 4.25 3.31
Crime 5157.54 1112.17 4361.50 1607.25
Urban 69.51 13.18 65.08 20.13
Income 21906.60 4359.95 21747.83 2396.42
Education 19.73 3.79 19.92 3.93
Religion 18.27 15.18 19.92 3.93
1996 Pres. Vote 48.74 6.72 40.68 6.75
House Partisanship 16.95 10.25 16.02 11.34
VoterParty ill 0.97 10.67 9.33 12.82
Ideology 20.30 10.35 12.58 9.44
Logistic Regression Analysis
The results of the initial logistic regression model is presented in Table 2.
It reveals the independent effects and the overall explanatory power of the
various independent variables on a state's policy regarding whether or not it
uses capital punishment. One thing that immedieately deserves to be mentioned
is the relatively high R-square of the model. The Cox & Snell R-Squared of
0.4760 and theNagelkerkeR-square of0.7140 tell us that between 48% and 71%
of the variation in whether or not a state uses capital punishment can be
explained by these 11 independent variables alone. These high R-squares are
even more amazing when one considers that there are only 46 cases in the
model.
Another aspect of the results that may seem surprising is that despite the
high R-squares, not a single independent variable in the model is statistically
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significant. However, this is not too surprising because the low number of
cases in the model makes it extremely difficult for any relationship to end up
being statistically significant. This lack of statistical significance does not
mean that one is unable to examine the individual effects ofeach independent
variable on the dependent variable. The positive or negative direction of the
various regression coefficients (B) allows one to analyze whether an increase
in an independent variable leads to a state being more or less likely to use
capital punishment. If an independent variable has a regression coefficient
with a negative sign, then any increase in it means that it is less likely to use
capital punishment.
The resulting regression coefficients reveal some very surprising
relationships. Many of the independent variables reveal relationships to the
dependent variable in the direction expected. As hypothesized, Table 2 shows
that a state with a higher minority population is more likely to use capital
punishment. The "Religion" regression coefficient (0.5489) also shows that a
state with a higher percentage of Fundamentalist Protestants in its population
is more likely to use capital punishment.
The regression coefficients for the four different political independent
variables indicate some very mixed results. The only political variable that had
the expected effect on the dependent variable was the 1996 Presidential vote.
The positive regression coefficient (0.7095) shows that states with a higher
vote for Bob Dole in the 1996 election are more likely to have capital punishment.
However, the other political variables did notbehave as expected. The regression
analysis indicates that as the number of self-identified Democrats and liberals
in a state increases, the likelihood of the state having capital punishment
increases. This clearly goes against the predictions set forth in the fifth
hypothesis. One possible explanation for this is that self-identified partisan
and ideological identification many not be true measures ofactual partisanship
and ideological beliefs. This explanation may be particularly relevant when
considering areas such as the South where one's national and local partisanship
may not be the same. Many southern conservatives in the South may leave the
polls after voting for Bob Dole and still declare themselves a Democrat because
locally the Democratic party has maintained its conservatism and separation
from the direction ofthe national party. Another plausible explanation is simply
that the conventional connection that has been made between partisanship,
ideology, and public opinion on capital punishment has been misunderstood.
Three other independent variables' regression coefficients reveal
relationships with the dependent variable in directions opposite than
hypothesized. The negative regression coefficients indicate that a state with a
lower murder rate, lower crime rate, and less competition in the state legislature
is more likely to use capital punishment. Before making any solid conclusions
about this data, it is necessary to ensure that this model is as representative of
reality as possible.
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Table 2
Use ofCapital Punishment
Independent Variable B S.E. Significance Exp (B)
Minority 0.5422 0.3507 0.1221 1.7197
Murder -0.0862 0.5094 0.8656 0.9174
Crime -0.0018 0.0013 0.1626 0.9982
Urban -0.0180 0.0786 0.8187 0.9821
Income 0.0003 0.0003 0.2670 1.0003
Education 0.6623 0.4845 0.1717 1.9392
Religion 0.5489 0.4127 0.1835 . 1.7314
1996 Pres. Voted .7095 0.4480 0.1133 2.0330
House Partisanship -0.0891 0.1493 0.5507 0.9147
Voter Party ill 0.1023 0.1349 0.4482 1.1078
Ideology -0.2682 0.2340 0.2517 0.7647
Constant -41.8513 20.0274 0.0366
Cox & Snell R2 0.4760
Nagelkerke R2 0.7140
After running this initial regression model, it became clear that the model
needed to be altered. One thing that is troubling about Table 2 is that many of
the regression coefficients reveal relationships that go in directions that are
opposite than expected and that some of them seem to contradict themselves.
One possible explanation for why states with larger Dole voters but lower self-
identified Republican and conservative voters are more likely to use capital
punishment is that a multicollinearity problem between these variables exists.
It is possible that using one political variable in the model produces more valid
results because it does not allow the resulting relationships to be contaminated
by the fact that the three are all highly correlated. A correlation matrix was run
to see what types of relationships exist between the independent variables.
The results are presented in Table 3. While the 0.603 Pearson correlation between
a state's murder rate and crime rate is statistically significant at the 0.00 1 level,
it does not seem high enough to be producing any false relationships in the
model. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn from the correlations
between the various political variables. A state's percentage vote for Bob Dole
in the 1996 election is highly correlated with both voter partisan identification
and ideological identification (-0.759 and 0.760 respectively). Both correlations
are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. These correlations indicate that
multicollinearity problems may be playing a role in the conflicting regression
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coefficients. It may be that the 1996 Presidential vote for Bob Dole is the most
accurate measure of a state's true partisanship and political identification.
Table3
Independent Variables' Correlation Matrix
12 345678 9
Minority I
Murder 0.588** I
Crime 0.577** 0.603**1
Urban 0.354* 0.250 0.597**1
Income 0.033 0.127 0.021 0.167 I
Education 0.073 -0.242 0.099 0.484**0.060 I
Pres -0.077 0.019 0.087 -0.186 -0.261 -0.298* I
H.P. 0.455** 0.401**0.136 -0.096 -0.109 -0.243 -0.047 I
Party ID 0.315* 0.254 -0.001 0.004 0.156 -0.052 -0.759**0.440**1
Ideology -0.046 0.151 0.004 -0.285*-0.198 -0.640** 0.760**0.260 -0.453**
*= Significant at the 0.05 level
**= Significant at the 0.0 1 level
Another problem with Table 2 is that it only has 46 cases because three
states were left out ofthe analysis. They were excluded because the figures for
the percentage of Fundamentalist Protestants in their population were
unavailable. In such a small population, every case has a large impact upon the
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable.
It is also important because the split between states that use and do not use
capital punishment is quite large.
It is necessary to run a new regression that addresses the two problems
just mentioned. The new model (Table 4) was run without the independent
variables for voter partisan and ideological identification. This allows us to
weed out any contaminating effect that a multicollinearity problem might be
causing. The new model uses the 1996 Presidential vote as its sole measure of
voter partisan identification. Table 4 also excludes the religious independent
variable because it allows one to see how the inclusion of the three additional
states might affect the data.
One of the most obvious effects of altering the model is that two
independent variables have relationships with the dependent variable that are
statistically significant. The murder rate and 1996 vote for Bob Dole are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The most interesting discrepancy
between the results in Table 2 and Table 4 is that a state's murder rate and the
competition in the state legislature were the only two independent variables
whose regression coefficients switched directions. The murder rate regression
coefficient switched from -0.0862 in Table 2 to 0.6134 in Table 4. According to
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Table 4, a state with a higher murder rate is more likely to use capital punishment.
Likewise, the regression coefficients for the level of competition in the state
legislature went from -0.0891 in Table 2 to 0.0422 in Table 4. Table 4 indicates
that as the level ofcompetition in a state's legislature increases, the likelihood
of that state having capital punishment increases. These two changes both
result in relationships that match the original hypothesis.
Table 4
Use ofCapital Punishment
Independent Variable B S.E. Significance Exp (B)
Minority 0.0248 0.0659 0.7062 1.0251
Murder 0.6134 0.2604 0.0185 1.8467
Crime -0.0006 0.0005 0.2426 0.9994
Urban -0.0246 0.0634 0.6986 0.9757
Income 0.0002 0.0002 0.3192 1.0002
Education 0.4830 0.2515 0.0548 1.6210
1996 Pres. Vote 0.0400 0.1543 .0095 1.4916
House Partisanship 0.0422 0.0656 0.5200 1.0431
Constant -29.7267 12.7642 0.0199
Cox & Snell R2 0.4350
NagelkerkeR2 0.6480
An additional regression was run to explore the possible interactive effects
that the region in which a state resides may be having. A primary reason why
this possible interactive effect needs to be explored is that it seems likely that
the percentage ofminorities in the population may have a different impact on
whether or not a state uses capital punishment in the non-South. It is an
accepted notion that the South is more racist and conservative than the non-
South. Due to the lessened presence of racism in the non-South, one could
expect that public policy in the non-South will be less influenced by the mere
presence of minorities in the population. It is actually reasonable to theorize
that the relationship will be negative due to differences in political and social
cultures between the South and the non-South. One would expect that minorities
are given a stronger voice in policy making outside of the South. Thus, states
with larger minority populations are going to have a larger and more vocal
coalition of those that do not support capital punishment.
The results presented in Table 5 show that the relationship between the
percentage ofminorities in a state's population and whether or not a state uses
capital punishment changes very little when examining only the non-South.
Even in the non-South, a state with a higher minority population is more likely
to use capital punishment.
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As already stated in the rationale for the fourth hypotheses, V.O. Key, Jf.
theorized that the "have nots" suffer in a state characterized by less competitive
party system. It is this theory that led to the hypothesis, "As the partisan split
in a state's lower house increases, the likelihood of its having capital punishment
increases." However, it is possible that the nature of this relationship depends
on the region a state is in. Key, Jr. remarks about the effects ofless competitive
politics on the fortunes of the "have nots" were specifically about the South.
Table 5 allows us to see if this relationship remains true when the southern
states are excluded from the population. The results seem to indicate that
region has some sort of interactive effect on the relationship between party
competition and the use of capital punishment. Table 4 shows that when all
states are considered increased partisan splits (less competition) in a state's
legislature increases the likelihood that a state will use capital punishment.
Table 5 reveals that when only non-southern states are considered, this
relationship no longer holds. In non-southern states, increased partisan splits
(less competition) in a state's legislature decreases the likelihood that a state
will use capital punishment. One possible explanation for the conflicting results
may be that there are more Democratic and liberal states in the North. Therefore,
sometimes large partisan splits and less competition will favor the Democrats.
Democrats are known for being ideologically liberal and thus are more likely to
oppose the use ofcapital punishment. Ifthis explanation is true, it would seem
to indicate that the relationship has more to do with what party is holding
power than just the level of competition alone.
Conclusion
This research has revealed many things that allow one to better understand
the determinants ofa state's capital punishment policy. The extremely high R-
squares of the various logistic regression models indicate that the models do
an outstanding job of explaining the variances in state capital punishment
policy. The results have the potential to be very practical to activists either
opposing or supporting the use of capital punishment in the United States.
The relationships between each independent variable and the dependent
variables indicate the nature of capital punishment policy. For example, this
research indicates that, overall, states with less competition in their state
legislature are more likely to use capital punishment. Therefore, public interest
groups devoted to fighting the use of capital punishment may want to devote
some of their resources to the campaigns of officials in the party holding less
power in the state's legislature. To efficiently summarize the findings of this
research, one can return to the five original hypotheses that this research
sought to examine.
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TableS
Use ofCapital Punishment
Non-South
Independent Variable B S.E. Significance Exp (B)
Minority 0.0401 0.0921 0.6632 1.0409
Murder 0.6081 0.3209 0.0581 1.8369
Crime -0.0012 0.0007 0.1109 0.9988
Urban -0.0061 0.0682 0.9284 0.9939
Income 0.0001 0.0002 0.4889 1.0001
Education 0.5700 0.2910 0.0501 1.7683
1996 Pres. Vote 0.4236 0.1689 0.0121 1.5275
House Partisanship -0.0141 0.0841 0.8672 0.9860
Constant -30.5285 14.3123 0.0329
Cox & Snell R2 0.4670
Nagelkerke R2 0.6550
The first hypothesis dealt with the effects that the percentage ofminorities
in the population has on capital punishment policy. It was hypothesized that
states with larger minority populations would be more likely to use capital
punishment. Every single regression table supports this hypothesis. In each
regression table, the number of minorities in the population had a positive
relationship with the use of capital punishment and the extremeness of its
usage. This supports V.O. Key, Jr. 's theory that Caucasians' political behavior
is partially influenced by their reactions to living among people of different
races. Unfortunately, this also indicates that America is not color-blind when it
comes to creating criminal justice policy. Prejudices and fear may still be driving
forces behind criminal justice policy making. These findings also show that,
for minorities, strength in numbers does not equate to increased input in the
development ofpublic policy. One result that is surprising is that the relationship
between the percentage of minorities in the population and a state's capital
punishment policies is almost identical for the model comprised of all states
and the model that excluded the southern states. This may hint at some
underlying inequalities and prejudices in other states that are not as overtly
racist as the South.
The second hypothesis stated that a state with a higher percentage of
Fundamentalist Protestants is more likely to use capital punishment. While
only Table 2 included the percentage of Fundamentalist Protestants in the
population as an independent variable, it does indicate that the hypothesis is
correct. These findings clearly support the research done on Oklahoma City
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residents' policy preferences by Grasmick, Cochran, Bursik, and Kimpel. It is
possible that this means that Fundamentalist Protestants have some influence
in state policy making. However, this model can neither establish nor refute
this. It is an issue that deserves to be examined in more detail.
The third hypothesis is that states with higher murder and crime rates will
be more likely to use capital punishment. It seems logical to conclude that
actual crime rates should directly influence the policies legislators produce to
combat these problems. This research used murder and crime rates as the
independent variables because past research has clearly shown that capital
punishment policies do not influence actual murder and crime rates. The results
from the regression analysis are mixed. There is a positive relationship between
a state's murder rate and whether or not it uses capital punishment. However,
the regression coefficients for a state's crime rate reveals a negative relationship.
The fourth hypothesis deals with the level of party competition between
the parties in government. Table 4 indicates that less partisan competition
within a state's legislature means that a state will be more likely to use capital
punishment. This clearly affirms this research's hypothesis that as the partisan
split in the State House increases, the likelihood of a state having capital
punishment increases. However, the results just mentioned do not fully reveal
the true nature of the relationship. Table 5 shows that the nature of this
relationship depends upon the region that a state is in. When the regression
models include all the states, V.O. Key, Jr. 's theory that the "have nots" will
suffer in states with non-competitive politics holds true and in the process
supports this research's hypothesis. However, when the regression model is
run to include only non-southern states, the relationship no longer holds. The
positive regression coefficient indicates that, in non-southern states, states
with less party competition are less likely to use capital punishment. Clearly,
the results for the non-southern states support Dye and Luttberg, not Key, Jr.
One possible explanation for this difference is simply that the southern states
are more Republican and conservative. Thus, it is their partisanship and
ideological beliefs driving the relationship as opposed to the actual influence
ofparty competition. This measure does not take into account which party was
favored by the partisan splits. Future research should determine a way to
control for which party is favored in each state so that the actual role of
competition can be isolated even more.
The final hypothesis was concerned with the relationship between voter
partisan identification and a state's capital punishment policy. It stated that the
likelihood ofa state using capital punishment increases when there is a higher
percentage of self-identified Republican voters. When using the 1996
Presidential vote as a measure of one's partisan ties, this hypothesis was
clearly affirmed. The fact that it was statistically significant in many of the
models reveals how strong ofa relationship it is. Future research may want to
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attempt to analyze whether this relationship is due to elected officials
representing the wishes of their constituency or if a politician's own opinions
act as an intervening variable in the relationship between the public's
partisanship and capital punishment policy.
While this research does set forth a new approach to studying and
understanding the nature of capital punishment policy in the United States,
there is much that future research needs to address. Many of the limitations
and needs for future research have been mentioned throughout the analysis.
However, a couple more aspects that need to be explored must be mentioned
because they are necessary to further the understanding of the use of capital
punishment in America. One independent variable that may have a large impact
on the development of capital punishment policy was not included in this
study. The amount of involvement various public interest groups put forth in
the different states may affect the state legislatures' policy outputs. Another
suggestion for future research is to examine any interactive effect that political
culture may have on capital punishment policy.
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